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The Effects of Media Campaigns on Individual Attitudes
towards Tax Compliance; Quasi-experimental Evidence
from Survey Data in Pakistan

Musharraf R. Cyan*, Antonios M. Koumpias** and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez***

Abstract
Pakistan has consistently performed low on taxation, with revenue collection hovering around 10 percent
of GDP. Tax reforms have been attempted but without significant gains in revenue collection. Due to the
recalcitrance of tax revenues, the tax authority attempted to enlist voluntary compliance as one of the
avenues for its efforts to increase collections. This paper examines the effectiveness of media campaigns
in the TV and national newspapers used by the Federal Board of Revenues of Pakistan to increase
awareness, tax filing, and, ultimately, tax morale. We use survey data that were collected in 2014
immediately after a communication campaign by Pakistan’s Federal Board of Revenue. Using coarsened
exact matching, we construct treatment and control groups that are nearly identical in terms of pretreatment balance of demographic and behavioral predictors of high tax morale. We find improved
perceptions towards tax compliance in Pakistan for respondents exposed to the TV and newspaper
advertisements. The choice of the advertisement’s delivery device is important since the latter is more
effective. Our findings provide empirical evidence that well timed campaigns can enhance voluntary
compliance in tax filing.
Keywords: Tax Morale, Tax Compliance, Social Norms, Social Interactions, Pakistan
JEL Classification: H26, K42
*Cyan: cyan@gsu.edu . ** Koumpias, Corresponding Author: akoumpias1@student.gsu.edu .*** MartinezVazquez: jorgemartinez@gsu.edu. All authors are affiliated with the International Center for Public Policy,
Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta Street,
Atlanta, GA 30303, USA.
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1.

Introduction

This paper examines the effectiveness of media campaigns in improving attitudes towards tax
compliance in Pakistan. Tax administrators in many developing countries grapple with tax
morale under tight administrative budgets, while organizational inertia favors routinized media
campaigns to improve tax morale and general tax compliance. Perhaps more than any other
country, this has been the case in Pakistan where for almost two decades the tax revenue to GDP
ratio has stubbornly remained below 11 percent of GDP despite repeated attempts at tax policy
reform (Martinez-Vazquez and Cyan, 2015). Other than setting up the usual tax facilitation
services, such as a Large Taxpayer Unit, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), the nation’s
premier tax collection agency, has acquired little experience in directly approaching taxpayers to
motivate higher voluntary tax compliance. Most public information campaigns have been low
cost efforts relying on mass media to lay out information on tax processes and filing deadlines.
The motivation behind those initiatives comes from experimental evidence showing that
increased tax knowledge improves individual perceptions of the fairness of the tax system
(Eriksen and Fallan, 1996). For example, Kasper, Kogler, and Kirchler (2015) using a surveybased experiment in Austria show that tax-related media coverage can affect taxpayers’
intentions to comply. Taxpayers’ trust of tax authorities may increase when exposed to media
content that highlights the trustworthy nature of the tax authority or its power to prevent tax
evasion. And Alm et al., (2010) provide evidence from lab experiments that agency-provided
information can have a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of filing a tax return as
well as accurate income tax reporting by individuals.
However, in Pakistan after the perennial lukewarm response from taxpayers, as a routine every
year, the filing deadlines are often extended several times. After years of attempting to broaden
the tax bases of direct taxes, the FBR has not been able to achieve its targets. From 2000 to 2014,
the number of individuals registered for personal income tax was raised from 0.75 to 3.6 million
but only with 0.98 million active filers in an estimated 56.5 million people that are employed in
the country. 1 The estimated number of people above the exemption threshold is 5.7 million. In
the case of corporate income tax, out of the 60 thousand companies that are registered on the
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rolls, only around 25 thousand file returns.2 As Kirchler et al. (2008) argue, when tax authorities
follow a “cops and robbers” approach, taxpayers will comply only when obliged to do in their
effort to maximize individual expected utility. This is a finding generalizable to other contexts
independent of cultural and economic characteristics. Kogler et al. (2013) recover the highest
level of intended tax compliance and the lowest level of tax evasion in conditions of high trust
and high power. Empirical evidence from Italy indicates that both coercive and legitimate
powers were associated with enforced compliance, but, also that enforced compliance leads to
increased evasion (Kastlunger et al., 2013). In a formalization of the “slippery-slope” framework,
Prinz et al. (2014) show that tax administrators should follow approaches that express both their
coercive power as well as their persuasive power to establish tax compliance. Indeed,
experimental evidence from Greece indicates that increased trust in the tax authorities as well as
a tougher approach on behalf of the tax authority can enhance voluntary compliance
(Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2015). Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) emphasize the scope of tax
morale considerations when conducting fiscal policy for three reasons. First, they offer solutions
in raising revenues more efficiently since the interaction between the taxpayer and the tax
authority is taken into account. Second, tax morale research allows for a broad assessment of
many mechanisms of tax compliance such as deterrence, government regulation, the quality of
publicly provided goods, the complexity, progressivity and incidence of the tax system and the
heterogeneous population within a society. Empirical evidence suggests that Pakistan’s
ethnically fractionalized background could pose a challenge in enhancing tax morale, though (Li,
2010).
The case of Pakistan might be salient in its potential taxpayer’s resilience at avoiding various
types of motivation to improve compliance but, it is by no means unique. Tax administrators aim
to maximize revenue collection but this cannot be accomplished by simply raising tax rates. 3
Thus, efforts should be made to also enhance tax morale. 4 To accomplish this goal, tax
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Kirchler et al. (2007) review the empirical literature of tax compliance and find overwhelming evidence of a
negative relation between tax rates and compliance.
4
Luttmer and Singhal (2014) distinguish among ﬁve classes of mechanisms affecting tax morale: intrinsic
motivation, reciprocity, peer and social eﬀects, culture, information imperfections and deviations from utility
maximization.
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administrators should consider simplifying the tax code, become more service-oriented and
introduce a kinder attitude towards taxpayers (Pickhardt and Prinz, 2014). Increasing voluntary
compliance with the tax code leads to eventually establishing a compliance norm (OECD, 2013).
In a growing number of countries, tax administration offices have been using field experiments
to test tax compliance responses to behavioral nudges (Torgler, 2011). However, field
experiments unfortunately are costlier and much harder to implement relative to simpler media
campaigns. Mainly for those reasons, media campaigns remain the staple tool for motivating
voluntary tax compliance. This persistence in their use and the low tax compliance levels raise
the question of whether these traditional media campaigns are serving any useful purpose or have
any identifiable impact. Saeed and Shah (2011) argue that advertising can help in widening the
tax net, if properly executed. They warn that advertising can be ineffective when tax policy is
undergoing constant changes. In addition, they stress that media campaigns may have differential
impact across different age and wealth groups based on each group’s medium of choice.
The main contribution of this paper is to offer the first quasi-experimental evaluation of the
effectiveness of different media campaigns used by a tax agency to enhance tax morale and
increase voluntary compliance. We use a novel, individual-level survey of randomly selected
Pakistani income tax filers that was conducted after the media campaigns and elicits attitudes
towards tax compliance. However, only a fraction of the survey respondent was exposed to the
media campaigns which gives rise to a natural experiment. We use this source of cross-sectional
variation to examine the effect of advertisements aired on the TV, printed in the newspapers, or
both on tax morale. First, our identification strategy exploits the random sample of survey
respondents to overcome self-selection to exposure to a media campaign. Then, it employs a
matching procedure that drastically increases the comparability of treated and control
respondents. The post-matching sample includes control observations with nearly identical
values of respondents’ predictors of tax morale and news source selection to the treated ones. To
identify the causal effect of media campaigns on tax morale we compare the average tax morale
of respondents exposed to the media campaign to the one of respondents not exposed to it using
a highly-balanced post-matching sample. From a policy perspective, evidence on the
effectiveness of media campaigns can be extremely important because of the simplicity in
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implementation, wide reach, and ease of scalability and scope of coverage of mass media
campaigns.
Increasingly, tax administration authorities around the world have recognized the centrality of
non-pecuniary factors to voluntary tax compliance. Acting on that recognition, many country tax
authorities have enacted a slew of policies in recent years. For example, the Estonian Tax and
Customs Board carried out information campaigns in 2010 and 2011 to proactively provide
information on the use of taxes by the state (Eurofound, 2013). Similarly, the Italian government
resorted to television and print advertising campaigns in 2011 to promote tax compliance
(Povoledo, 2011). These administrative initiatives have spurred the recent wave of literature of
field experiments about what motivates firms and individuals to pay their taxes voluntarily
(Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod, 2001; Castro and Scartascini, 2015; Chirico et al., 2014;
Del Carpio, 2014; Dwenger et al., 2014; Fellner-Roehling, Sausgruber, and Traxler, 2013;
Hallsworth et al., 2014; Kleven et al., 2011; Ortega and Scartascini, 2015); Perez-Truglia and
Troiano, 2015; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian, 2001). However, all the existing evidence to
this date on the effectiveness of behavioral strategies to enhance tax morale in developing
countries comes from Latin America. In the context of Chile, Pomeranz (2015) reports that an
increase in the perceived audit probability of randomly chosen Chilean firms increases
compliance to the VAT. Castro and Scartascini (2013) found that sanction-based messaging
successfully generated more property tax revenues to the Argentine tax authority. However,
appeals to tax fairness and tax equity did not effectively increase property tax revenues. In
Venezuela, Ortega and Sanguinetti (2013) show that enforcement messaging has the largest
effect on compliance. This study also suggests that moral suasion is ineffective in bringing about
taxpayer responses. Del Carpio (2014) finds that a combination of a payment reminder and
deterrence information enhances tax compliance of a local property tax in Peru because it
increases the perception of enforcement. In a rare exception to the use of field experiments,
Sanchez (2014) provides evidence from a low-cost tax compliance campaign in Peru targeting
firms that misreport their tax obligations. Using a regression-discontinuity approach, he reports
very substantial increases in tax reporting which implies a very high return for each notification
intervention by the tax agency.

6

International Center for Public Policy

However, in this growing body of literature, the focus of the empirical analysis has almost
exclusively been on message content rather than device of delivery. But the mode of
communication, and not only the content, might play a crucial role in a campaign’s success. The
early interventions of behavioral tax compliance relied almost exclusively on physical letters as
the device to nudge taxpayers with only two recent exceptions. Ortega and Scartascini (2015)
report sizable differences across the effectiveness of a letter, an e-mail, and a personal visit by a
tax inspector in a field experiment of the National Tax Agency in Colombia. Koumpias (2016),
in a 2013 natural experiment by the Tax Compliance Unit of the Greek Treasury, shows that the
impact of payment deadline reminder phone calls on tax payments, relative to e-mails, is
markedly different. In a somewhat different domain of citizen behavior, there is substantial
empirical evidence of similar nudges given through impersonal methods like robotic phone
messages (Ramirez, 2005; Shaw et al., 2012) and emails (Stollwerk, 2006) as being ineffective in
changing voting behavior. On the contrary, face-to-face canvassing (Gerber and Green, 2000)
and phone calls (Imai, 2005; Arceneaux, 2007; Nickerson, 2006; Arceneaux and Nickerson,
2006) are associated with larger behavioral responses than non-personalized methods such as
flyers. Thus, not only the content of the nudge may matter for enhancing tax morale but also the
means for its delivery.

2.

Data

We use survey data that were collected in 2014 immediately after a communication campaign by
Pakistan’s Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).5 The campaign was financed by the United
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) that supports FBR’s external
communications interventions. In advance of the 2013-14 tax return submission deadline, the
DFID assisted the implementation of a short-term FBR External Communications Awareness
Raising Pilot Campaign through its service provider, Adam Smith International. In preparation

There have been earlier attempts to elicit taxpayers’ perceptions towards tax compliance in Pakistan. Mughal and
Akram (2012) survey taxpayers to determine predictors of tax avoidance and evasion in Pakistan. Awan and Hannan
(2014) survey taxpayers and tax officers and Khan and Ahmad (2014) survey students’ attitudes about tax
compliance to elicit determinants of tax evasion in southern Punjab, Pakistan. However, the studies are mainly
descriptive based on small-scaled, primary data collection attempts, not initiated by the FBR, that might not be
nationally representative.
5
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for this campaign, Adam Smith International commissioned Semiotics Consultants Private
Limited to undertake a Baseline Taxpayer Perception Survey of eligible individuals across
Pakistan’s four provinces to inform FBR of the existing tax return filing dynamics. The FBR
used this evidence to understand the underlying perceptions of eligible taxpayers about tax filing
and design of the pilot communication campaign. Upon completion of the Pilot Campaign,
Semiotics Consultants was selected to conduct a follow-up perception survey. The survey data
we use contain information about the extent of shift in taxpayer attitude, tax return filing
behavior as well as the reach and efficacy of the communication instruments deployed.
The follow-up perception survey took place in major metropolitan areas across the country in
line with the baseline survey. Metropolitan areas were selected based on major industry and
economic activity locations, thereby having a higher proportion of eligible tax filers. Thus, ten
(10) metropolitan areas were identified in the four (4) provinces. Equal apportioning across the
metropolitan areas was adequate to obtain public perceptions regarding tax return filing and the
communications campaign given the province-wide metropolitan area/eligible tax-payer spread.
Since the number of eligible taxpayers was unknown, a minimum number of individuals was
taken at which skewness and kurtosis becomes irrelevant. From each metropolitan area, around
200 tax eligible individuals were selected at random resulting in a total sample of 2,000 across
10 areas. Selection of tax return filers and non-filers took place from the same localities where
the baseline perception survey had taken place. Only those individuals who were eligible to pay
tax based on their responses were selected for the survey. As a result of visits to multiple
localities within a metropolitan area, individuals from a mix of economic sectors were targeted
(e.g., salaried and non-salaried individuals deriving incomes from other sources).
Our dependent variable is constructed from survey responses to the statement “Cheating on taxes
in Pakistan is never justifiable”. The framing hints towards outright illegal tax evasion which
ensures that taxpayers do not convey their perceptions about legal practices with similar effects
on tax revenue yields such as tax avoidance or tax flight which are known to be evaluated
differently (Kirchler et al., 2003). The answers were recorded on a scale from 1 to 5 but we
collapse the ordinal information to an indicator variable, as is customary in the empirical tax
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morale literature. Our outcome variable, 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 , takes the value of one if respondent 𝑖
strongly agreed, or agreed to the previous statement and zero if respondent 𝑖 neither agreed nor
disagreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed to the previous statement. Thus, our measure captures
positive attitudes towards tax compliance; i.e., respondents with high tax morale.

3.

Methods

3.1

Identification Strategy

To identify the causal effect of the media campaigns in raising tax morale, we need to compare
respondents who would have otherwise had identical tax morale, on average, and were randomly
exposed to the media campaign with those that were not. To circumvent the endogenous exposure
of individuals to the media campaign and its delivery device (e.g. TV, newspapers, social media)
we use a sample of randomly selected, eligible tax-filers in Pakistan. We further control for
selection of media device by matching on the respondent’s selected news source Next, we employ
matching techniques to ensure that, in the absence of the media campaign, treated and control
respondents would exhibit comparable tax morale. We achieve this by matching on documented
predictors of high tax morale. The Baseline Taxpayer Perception Survey provides the “training
dataset” which the empirical literature has used to uncover the determinants of tax morale in
Pakistan (Cyan, Koumpias and Martinez-Vazquez, 2016). Based on this pre-treatment evidence,
we match on tax morale predictors identified as most significant in the previous literature. To
identify the effect of the media campaigns, we regress the tax morale outcome variable on a
constant and the treatment variable using matching weights.

3.2

Coarsened Exact Matching

The key goal of matching is to prune observations from the data so that the remaining data have
better balance between the treated and control respondents; that is, make the empirical distributions
of the covariates (𝑿) more similar (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2011). Exact matching matches a treated
respondent to all of the controls with exactly the same covariate values. Typically, this procedure
leads to very small sample sizes for the control group. However, it requires no additional adjusting
and a difference in means estimator finds the causal effect. Approximate matching methods find
controls that are close to the treated respondent. This is often done on the basis of statistics such
as the Mahalanobis distance, the propensity score (the probability of being treated, conditional on
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the covariates), or coarsened exact matches. In this case, controlling for 𝑿 in a typical regressionlike form is necessary. The benefits of matching are that estimates suffer from less bias, are less
model-dependent, and more efficient (Ho et al., 2007).
Coarsened Exact Matching
CEM separates the observations in strata of identical coarsened values for covariates. Then, the
observations coming from strata that do not retain both a treated and a control respondent are
removed. Next, CEM assigns weights to matched and unmatched respondents such that all
differences across treatment and control groups (imbalances) are eliminated. Specifically, the
CEM treats multivariate non-linearities, interactions, moments, quantiles, comoments, and any
distributional differences up to the chosen level of coarsening (Iacus, King, amd Porro, 2011).
The inherent trade-off of matching is reflected in CEM too: larger bins (more coarsening) will
result in fewer strata. Fewer strata will result in more diverse observations within the same strata
and, thus, higher imbalance. It is important to note that CEM prunes both treated and control
respondents. This process changes the quantity of interest under study to the treatment effect in
the post matching subsample. Specifically, our estimand is the sample average treatment effect on
the treated (SATT). That is, we focus on the average treatment effect on tax morale for those
exposed to the media campaigns in the post-matching sample.
In Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix we show that results from a naïve estimation on the
unprocessed, the pre-matching sample are fairly comparable in terms of direction (sign) but not
statistical significance to the post-matching estimates. This provides internal validity to our main
CEM-weighted Estimates as it illustrates that results are not very sensitive to the research design.
And more importantly, establishes that the quantity of interest does change substantially despite
pruning. Thus, inference can be drawn about the entirety of the nationally representative sample.
CEM makes an explicit statement about the initial level of covariate imbalance between treated
respondents and untreated ones. Furthermore, it provides with the margin of covariate balance
improvement in percentage terms after matching. This provides a transparent indication of the
extent to which the CEM-weighted Estimates have a causal interpretation. The overall imbalance
is given by the 𝐿1 statistic, introduced in Iacus, King and Porro (2008) as a comprehensive measure
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of global imbalance. It is based on the 𝐿1 difference between the multidimensional histogram of
all pretreatment covariates in the treated group and that in the control group. This measure includes
imbalance with respect to the full joint distribution, including all interactions, of the covariates.
Thus, 𝐿1 works for imbalance as 𝑅 2 works for model fit: the absolute values mean less than
comparisons between matching solutions. Perfect global balance (up to coarsening) is indicated
by 𝐿1 = 0, and larger values indicate larger imbalance between the groups, with a maximum of
𝐿1 = 1, which indicates complete separation.

4.

Results

4.1

TV Ad Campaign

Next, we compute the 𝐿1 statistic, as well as several unidimensional measures of imbalance
between the distributions of the predictors of tax morale for respondents who were exposed to
the TV ad and the control group.
Table 1: Covariate Imbalance between Respondents Exposed to TV Ad and Controls
Multivariate 𝐿1 Distance = 0.58842155
Univariate Imbalance Indicators:
Meanb
Minc 25%c 50%e
𝐿1 a
Female
0.105
0.105
0
0
0
Self-employed
0.01322
0.01322
0
0
0
Pensioner
0.00353
-0.00353
0
0
0
High-school
0.03662
-0.03662
0
0
0
Master’s
0.04287
0.04287
0
0
0
Vocational
0.00211
-0.00211
0
0
0
News Source
0.05795
-0.04789
0
0
0
Balochistan
0.05073
-0.05073
0
0
0
Kpk
0.03097
0.03097
0
0
0
Punjab
0.01064
0.01064
0
0
0
Sindh
0.00912
0.00912
0
0
0
Good Use of Tax
0.03486
0.03486
0
0
0
Tax doesn’t Affect Investment
0.01051
0.01051
0
0
0
Recurring Government Spending
0.00671
0.00671
0
0
0
FBR will not Audit
0.01428
0.01428
0
0
0
Filing Tax a Social Responsibility
0.00217
-0.00217
0
0
0
Richer Pay More Taxes
0.00403
0.00403
0
0
0
Tax System is Fair
0.01871
-0.01871
0
0
0
Notes:
a
Univariate distance.
b
Difference in means.
c
Difference in empirical quintile at 0, 25 th, 50th, 75th, 100th percentile.

75%c
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Maxc
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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The first column, labeled 𝐿1 , reports the 𝐿𝑗1 measure, which is 𝐿1 computed for the jth variable
separately (which of course does not include interactions). The second column of Table 1,
labeled mean, reports the difference in means. The remaining columns in the table report the
difference in the empirical quintiles of the distributions of the two groups for the 0th (min), 25th,
50th, 75th, and 100th (max) percentiles for each variable.
For instance, the first row of the table suggests that the indicator variable of female sex is
somewhat balanced in the raw data in means but completely separated in the 75% quintile of the
two distributions. This table also illustrates the point that balancing only the means between the
treated and control groups does not necessarily guarantee balance in the rest of the distribution.
The age variable (continuous) is imbalanced in different directions, denoted by positive and
negative signs, across different quintiles of its overall distribution.
Still, the most important metric of covariate balance is the overall 𝐿1 measure. Even if the
marginal distribution of every variable is perfectly balanced, the joint distribution can still be
highly imbalanced. The multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 0.58842155 indicates that predictor values
of tax morale determinants in Pakistan between those exposed to the TV ad and those who did
not come across any FBR communication campaign are fairly non-comparable.
Effect of TV Ad Campaign on Tax Morale
The output contains useful information about the match, including a (small) table about the
number of observations in total, matched, and unmatched by treatment group. Since CEM
bounds the imbalance ex ante, the most important information is the number of observations
matched. But the results also give the imbalance in the matched data using the same measures as
that in the original data.
First, we apply the CEM algorithm for a set of demographic matching criteria that has been
found to be significant determinants of tax morale in Pakistan. We stratify the sample in 132
strata and match on 56 of them. This yields a total of 1,444 observations comprised of 365
respondents exposed to the TV ad and 1079 as controls. That is, 21 treated and 145 untreated
observations were discarded because they take outlier values for significant determinants of tax
morale. This produces a very substantial reduction in imbalance, not only in the means, but also
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in the marginal and joint distributions of the data. The post matching multivariate 𝐿1 distance of
3.619𝑒 −15 ≈ 0 indicates almost perfect global balance.
Next, we introduce more matching criteria based on behavioral factors of tax morale. The
stratification gives rise to 555 distinct strata and we are able to match 131 of them. This produces
a total of 959 observations comprised of 290 respondents exposed to the TV ad and 669 as
controls. This process prunes 96 treated and 555 untreated observations from the sample. Again,
the reduction in imbalance is very large but the introduction of more matching variables, even,
led to a slight improvement; multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 1. 208𝑒 −15 ≈ 0.
Both matching exercises, lead to almost identical treated and control groups in terms of pretreatment covariate balance. Recall that in exact matching, conditional on covariates, the
potential outcomes are independent of actual treatment. In other words, selection bias disappears
after conditioning on covariates. Since 𝐿1 is approximately equal to zero, CEM effectively
achieves nearly exact matching. Then, the estimated difference in mean tax morale provides an
estimate of the treatment effect that may have a causal interpretation; that is, assuming we did
not omit important predictors of tax morale.
Table 2: CEM-weighted Estimates: Effect of TV Ad Campaign on Tax Moralea
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
High Tax Morale Indicatorb
Ordinal Tax Moralec
High Tax Morale Indicatorb
TV Ad
Constant
Observations

0.381*d
(0.213)e
-0.886***
(0.260)
1,444

0.175
(0.111)

(4)
Ordinal Tax Moralec

0.297
(0.252)
-0.851***
(0.321)
959

0.178
(0.117)

1,444
Notes:
a
Results are based on the post-matching sample using CEM weights and reported at mean values.
b
Outcome is an indicator taking the value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees that
“cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable” and zero, otherwise.
c
Outcome is an ordinal measure of whether “cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable”.
d
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
e
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level.

In columns (1) and (3) of Table 2, we estimate probit regressions of whether the respondent has
high tax morale. In columns (2) and (4), we estimate ordered probit regressions of the respondent
attitudes towards tax morale, respectively, matching only on demographic, then both
demographic and behavioral factors of tax morale.
We find that the TV ad had a positive and significant effect on positive attitudes towards tax

959
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compliance when we match on significant demographic determinants of tax morale. However,
when we introduce more stringent matching criteria, and, subsequently, reduce power, the effect
becomes smaller and is not significant at conventional levels anymore.
Also, we show that the TV ad did shift attitudes towards tax morale when exploring its ordinal
measures. The overall effect is positive but smaller and not significant. We also provide
estimates for the ancillary parameters which are used to differentiate the adjacent levels of the
response variable. Interpretation of the ordered probit estimates is independent of the ancillary
parameters.

4.2

Newspaper Ad Campaign

Next, we explore the impact of the newspaper ad campaign on perceptions about tax compliance.
Table 3 below displays the distributional differences of variables that determine attitudes towards
tax compliance between respondents who read the newspaper ad only and the controls group.
Table 3: Covariate Imbalance between Respondents Exposed to Newspaper Ad and Controls
Multivariate 𝐿1 Distance = 0.65162413
Univariate Imbalance Indicators:
Meanb
Minc 25%c 50%c 75%c
𝐿1 a
Female
0.04508
-0.04508
0
0
0
0
Self-employed
0.05036
-0.05036
0
0
0
0
Pensioner
0.00621
0.00621
0
0
0
0
High-school
0.01477
-0.01477
0
0
0
0
Master’s
0.04882
0.04882
0
0
0
0
Vocational
0.00135
0.00135
0
0
0
0
News Source
0.19594
-0.27191
0
0
0
0
Balochistan
0.00432
-0.00432
0
0
0
0
Kpk
0.02404
-0.02404
0
0
0
0
Punjab
0.02776
0.02776
0
0
0
0
Sindh
0.0006
0.0006
0
0
0
0
Good Use of Tax
0.0293
0.0293
0
0
0
0
Tax doesn’t Affect Investment
0.00189
0.00189
0
0
0
0
Recurring Government Spending
0.02808
0.02808
0
0
0
0
FBR will not Audit
0.0353
0.0353
0
0
0
0
Filing Tax a Social Responsibility
0.02874
0.02874
0
0
0
0
Richer Pay More Taxes
0.0148
0.0148
0
0
0
0
Tax System is Fair
0.04571
-0.04571
0
0
0
0
Notes:
a
Univariate distance.
b
Difference in means.
c
Difference in empirical quintile at 0, 25 th, 50th, 75th, 100th percentile.

Maxc
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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The multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 0.65162413 in Table 3 indicates that the pre-treatment predictor
values of tax morale determinants in Pakistan between those exposed to the newspaper ad and
those who did not come across any FBR communication campaign are fairly distinct. In fact, the
separation of covariates values of those exposed to the newspaper ad relative to the control
respondents is more acute than of those exposed to the TV ad. Note that for all predictors, but the
“News Source” variable, the univariate imbalance is equivalent to the absolute value of the mean
pre-treatment predictor difference between those exposed to the newspaper ad and the control. 6
Effect of Newspaper Ad Campaign on Tax Morale
Similarly to the TV ad campaign, we, initially, match on statistically significant demographic
determinants of tax morale in Pakistan. We stratify the sample in 123 strata and match on 44 of
them. This leaves us with a total of 1,153 observations comprised of 194 respondents exposed to
the newspaper ad and 959 as controls. Alternatively, CEM prunes 5 treated and 265 untreated
observations away from the sample on the basis on non-comparability. Again, this leads to an
extremely balanced post-matching sample with a multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 2.443𝑒 −15 ≈ 0.
To ensure our estimates of the effect of the newspaper ad campaign on tax morale are not subject
to omitted variables bias from the exclusion of characteristics that have been found to determine
tax morale in Pakistan, we match on additional behavioral factors. This increases the
dimensionality of matching substantially as it produces 518 strata where we match on 76 of
them. This generates a post-matching sample of 631 observations comprised of 154 respondents
exposed to the newspaper ad and 477 as controls or, equivalently, discarding 45 treated and 747
untreated observations. Pre-processing the observations leads to a very balanced sample again
(multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 2.672𝑒 −15). However, the reduction in imbalance is negligible
which, in turn, casts doubt over the necessity of matching on behavioral factors.
Since the multivariate 𝐿1 distance in both post-matching samples is infinitesimally low the
coefficient of the newspaper variable reveals the SATT of exposure to the newspaper ad
campaign on tax morale. In columns (1) and (3) of Table 4, we estimate probit regressions of
whether the respondent has high tax morale, respectively. In columns (2) and (4), we estimate
ordered probit regressions of the respondent attitude towards tax morale matching on
6

A similar pattern can be deduced from the Covariate Imbalance table with regards to the TV campaign as well.
This is, generally, the case when the predictor variable is an indicator.
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demographic only, and demographic and behavioral factors of tax morale, respectively.
Table 4: CEM-weighted Estimates: Effect of Newspaper Ad Campaign on Tax Morale a
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
High Tax Morale Indicatorb
Ordinal Tax Moralec
Ordinal Tax Moraleb
Ordinal Tax Moralec

VARIABLES

0.418*d
(0.224)e
-0.802***
(0.242)
1,153

Newspaper Ad
Constant
Observations

0.268*
(0.160)

0.528**
(0.264)
-0.877***
(0.264)
631

0.368**
(0.167)

1,153
Notes:
a
Results are based on the post-matching sample using CEM weights and reported at mean values.
b
Outcome is an indicator taking the value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees that
“cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable” and zero, otherwise.
c
Outcome is an ordinal measure of whether “cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable”.
d
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
e
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level.

631

Our findings suggest that the newspaper ad campaign had a positive and significant effect on
positive attitudes towards tax compliance over both sets of matching criteria. As a matter of fact,
when we introduce more stringent matching criteria, the effect is not attenuated but becomes
larger and more significant. These results provide convincing evidence that newspaper ad
campaigns can causally enhance tax morale in Pakistan. Contrary to the TV ad, the results based
on ordinal measures of tax morale indicate that the newspaper ad campaign had a positive and
significant effect on attitudes towards tax compliance. The fact that this result is detectable even
from a relative underpowered test based on a smaller sample to what is available for the test of
TV ad effectiveness, highlights that newspapers were substantially more effectively as a nudging
device.

4.3

Combined TV and Newspaper Advertisement Campaigns

In this section, we investigate the cumulative impact of exposure to the TV ad and the newspaper
ad campaigns, an underpowered test as only 84 respondents were exposed to both ads.
Table 5: Covariate Imbalance between Respondents Exposed to both Ads and Controls
Multivariate 𝐿1 Distance = 0.77077498
Univariate Imbalance Indicators:
Meanb
Minc 25%c 50%e
𝐿1 a
Female
0.12745
0.12745
0
0
0
Self-employed
0.03606
-0.03606
0
0
0
Pensioner
0.01389
-0.01389
0
0
0

75%c
1
0
0

Maxc
0
0
-1

16

International Center for Public Policy

High-school
0.0859
-0.0859
0
Master’s
0.12115
0.12115
0
Vocational
0.0056
0.0056
0
News Source
0.24195
-0.39461
0
Balochistan
0.13142
0.13142
0
Kpk
0.16235
-0.16235
0
Punjab
0.02871
-0.02871
0
Sindh
0.05964
0.05964
0
Good Use of Tax
0.00525
0.00525
0
Tax doesn’t Affect Investment
0.04914
-0.04914
0
Recurring Government Spending
0.02521
0.02521
0
FBR will not Audit
0.22351
0.22351
0
Filing Tax a Social Responsibility
0.02288
0.02288
0
Richer Pay More Taxes
0.01984
-0.01984
0
Tax System is Fair
0.05707
-0.05707
0
Notes:
a
Univariate distance.
b
Difference in means.
c
Difference in empirical quintile at 0, 25 th, 50th, 75th, 100th percentile.

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 5 above that the multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 0.77077498 suggests that the pre-treatment
predictor values of tax morale determinants in Pakistan between those exposed to both the TV ad
and the newspaper ad relative to the control group are very different. This is the largest covariate
imbalance in any treatment group we examine which merits matching even more important.
Cumulative Effect of TV Ad and Newspaper Ad Campaign on Tax Morale
Matching on demographics only disaggregates the sample to 118 strata where we match on 28.
The post-matching sample is comprised of 84 treated respondents and 624 controls, a total of 708
observations. The matching algorithm excludes 600, untreated only, observations from the postmatching sample. The multivariate 𝐿1 distance is equal to 1.026𝑒 −15 (≈ 0) which translates to an
approximately fully balanced sample.
Introducing behavioral factors in the matching process appears to have a substantial effect on the
estimand as CEM prunes 16 treated observations and 923 untreated ones. The resulting postmatching sample contains 301 untreated and 68 treated units over 43 matched strata (out of a
total of 489 strata). Given this set of predictors, the multivariate 𝐿1 distance is equal to
1.562𝑒 −15 (≈ 0).
In columns (1) and (3), we estimate probit regressions of whether the respondent has high tax
morale, respectively. In columns (2) and (4), we estimate ordered probit regressions of the
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respondent attitude towards tax morale matching on demographic only, and demographic and
behavioral factors of tax morale, respectively.

VARIABLES
TV & Newspaper Ads
Constant

Table 6: CEM-weighted Estimates: Effect of Double Nudge on Tax Morale a
(1)
(2)
(3)
High Tax Morale Indicatorb Ordinal Tax Moralec
High Tax Moraleb
-0.0822d
-0.154
-0.0199
(0.532)e
(0.319)
(0.619)
-0.592**
-0.609*
(0.242)
(0.312)
708
708
369

(4)
Ordinal Tax Moralec
-0.145
(0.347)

Observations
Notes:
a
Results are based on the post-matching sample using CEM weights and reported at mean values.
b
Outcome is an indicator taking the value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees that
“cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable” and zero, otherwise.
c
Outcome is an ordinal measure of whether “cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable”.
d
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
e
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level.

369

The analysis lacks power to identify any statistically significant effects of exposure to both ads.
The table above shows that the overall cumulative effect of both the TV and the newspaper ad
campaigns was zero independent of matching criteria. Interestingly, these findings point towards
the potential of tax morale fatigue following repeated behavioral nudging on behalf of the tax
agency. But, as aforementioned, these estimates should be taken with a grain of salt; the sample
size is not sufficiently large to engage in truly meaningful inference.

5.

Robustness Checks

Finally, we assess the robustness of our findings based on the high tax morale indicator outcome
to the choice of matching method. Table 7 below presents results from two popular alternative
matching procedures to CEM; namely, propensity score matching and matching based on the
Mahalanobis distance. The latter is based on the assumption that the controls follow a normal (or
elliptic distribution) whereas the former holds if the model of the propensity score is not
misspecified. However, we dismiss both of those concerns on the following grounds. First,
random sampling of the survey respondents guarantees that the controls are normally distributed.
Second, the availability of a pre-intervention as a training sample allows us to identify the
statistically significant determinants of tax morale in Pakistan and prevent misspecification. The
resulting covariate balance between treatment and control confirms that the propensity score was
correctly specified.
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Table 7: Effect of Media Campaigns on Tax Morale: Robustness across Matching Methodsa
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Treatment
PSM
Mahalanobis
PSM
` Mahalanobis
Distance
Distance
Exposed to TV Ad
0.085*b
0.172*
0.135***
0.141**
(0.059)c
(0.096)
(0.033)
(0.054)
Exposed to Paper Ad
0.217**
0.139***
0.145**
0.149*
(0.076)
(0.032)
(0.046)
(0.082)
Exposed to both TV and Paper Ad
0.055
-0.083
0.010
0.058
(0.088)
(0.140)
(0.063)
(0.099)
Matching on Demographic Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Matching on Behavioral Controls
No
No
Yes
Yes
Notes:
a
Results are based on the post-matching samples using propensity score weights and reported at mean
values. Outcome is an indicator taking the value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees that
“cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable” and zero, otherwise.
b
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
c
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level.

Relative to CEM, the results are fairly robust with respect to the sign of the coefficient but not
the magnitudes. Specifically, the estimated effects from PSM and from matching on the
Mahalanobis distance suggest that the behavioral response is smaller. Nevertheless, the main
takeaways remain the same independent of matching procedure. PSM findings suggest that the
paper ad brings about a stronger behavioral change in respondents’ attitudes towards tax
compliance relative to the TV ad. Results from matching on the Mahalanobis distance implies
the same for the full model that includes behavioral covariates as well. In confirmation of the
CEM findings, exposure to both a TV and a newspaper ad has null effects on tax compliance.
This evidence does not dismiss the possibility that multiple behavioral nudging on behalf of the
tax agency can lead to tax morale fatigue.
However, it should be noted that the balance achieved with CEM is superior. PSM and matching
on Mahalanobis distance do not discard as many observations as CEM does. This leads to postmatching estimated effects which are generally not very different to the ones from the raw, preprocessed sample. Moreover, PSM and Mahalanobis matching lead to net improvements in terms
of overall bias reduction but perform worse for some variables. On the other hand, CEM leads to
improvements across the board at the expense of power by discarding more non-comparable
observations. Therefore, we interpret the results of the robustness checks as a general
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confirmation of the main analysis. The discrepancy could be attributed to the inferior balance
achieved with the alternative matching methods.

6.

Concluding Remarks

This paper examines the effect of different media campaigns in Pakistan on the underlying tax
morale of tax filing-eligible individuals who were exposed to them. Using a novel survey data of
Pakistani income tax filers, we show via CEM that both TV and newspaper ads can improve
individual perceptions towards tax compliance in Pakistan. Moreover, we find that the effect of
the newspaper ad is stronger than the effect of the TV ad. This result underlines the importance
of the delivery device for the efficacy of the media campaign. It could be explained by the
underlying selection of exposure into the two media. It is reasonable to assume that the
newspapers readers are more educated, more senior and at a better socio-economic status than
those who saw the TV ad, on average. Recall that CEM equalizes the differences in
characteristics between those exposed to the TV ad and the newspaper ad relative to the control
group but not with respect to each other. Thus, the larger magnitude of the newspaper ad might
be simply due to the fact the respondent exposed to it exhibit characteristics that are known to
lead to superior tax compliance outcomes.
Kleven and Waseem (2013) show that Pakistani taxpayers’ earnings do respond to pecuniary
incentives presented by the distortionary nature of notched incentive schemes of the tax code.
We illustrate the potential for behavioral shifting of attitudes towards tax compliance using nonpecuniary, moral suassion incentives presented by the FBR in the form of ads in media
campaigns. We provide empirical evidence that well timed campaigns can enhance voluntary
compliance. Even if such campaigns may not shift norms permanently, they could produce
marginal effects on filing making them worthwhile to tax administration.
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APPENDIX:
Within the limited timeframe, a
strategic sampling strategy was
used to ensure significance and
efficiency to allow for adequate
analysis to take place.

From each metropolitan area,
around 200 tax eligible individuals
were selected at random resulting
in a total sample of 2,000 across
10 areas.

Naïve OLS Estimates: Effect of Different Nudging Devices on Tax Morale
Table A.1: Unadjusted OLS Estimates of Effect of Media Campaigns on Tax Moralea
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
TV
Newspapers
TV & Newspaper Ads
TV
0.175b
(0.148)c
Newspapers
0.308*
(0.167)
TV & Newspaper Ads
-0.0209
(0.492)
Third Devices
Constant
Observations

-0.691***
(0.228)
1,954

-0.688***
(0.222)
1,954

-0.654***
(0.231)
1,954

Notes:
a
Results are based on the raw sample using no weights and reported at mean values. Outcome is an
indicator taking the value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees that “cheating on taxes in
Pakistan is never justifiable” and zero, otherwise. Explanatory variables include the treatment indicator
and a constant.
b
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
c
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level.

(4)
Third Devices

1.038**
(0.461)
-0.684***
(0.222)
1,954
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Table A.2: Unadjusted OLS Estimates of Effect of Media Campaigns on Tax Moralea
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
TV
Newspapers
TV & Newspaper Ads
TV
0.0386b
(0.0985)c
Newspaper
0.177
(0.116)
TV & Newspaper Ads
-0.131
(0.290)
Third Devices
Constant
Observations

-0.871***
(0.196)
1,954

-0.861***
(0.203)
1,954

(4)
Third Devices

-0.884***
(0.211)
1,954

0.901*
(0.500)
-0.864***
(0.204)
1,954

Notes:
a
Results are based on the raw sample using no weights and reported at mean values. Outcome is an
ordinal measure of whether “cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable”. a Explanatory variables
include the treatment indicator and a constant.
b
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
c
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level.
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